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SUMMARY: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND REGIONAL WELFARE
In regional economics the impact oÍ regional policies on the spatial distribution welÍare is
a well studied subject. The impact oÍ central government policies, like social security and
tax programmes, however, is often neglected. In The Netherlands regional policy absorbs
only 3 percent oÍ the total budget oÍ the central government. Spatial impacts oÍ the
remaining 97 percent oÍ the budget will - most probably - be much larger. One cannot
draw conclusions as to the etfectiveness oÍ regional policy, when efÍects oÍ the largest
part oÍ the budget are unclear. The aim oÍ this study is to investigate the impact oÍ the
Íiscal flows oÍ the Dutch central government and Dutch social security Íunds (ESA 561
and 563) on interprovincial ditÍerences in welÍare.
fn most regional Íiscal incidence studies the efÍect oÍ Íiscal policy on regional income
difÍerences is studied. Citizens receive benefits Írom the central government in the Íorm
oÍ subsidies or public goods, and they pay taxes and social security contributions. The
question then is: Does a region receive more than it pays? These net f iscal incidence
studies can be divided in tax incidence and expenditure incidence studies. Expenditure
incidence studies can be Íurther divided into 'source oÍ income' studies and 'use oÍ
income' studies (Greene, 1974). The Íirst group oÍ studies is interested in the regional
distribution oÍ inputs used to produce the publicly provided goods. Salaries and
investments e.9., generate primary income in the receiving regions. BeneÍil studies are
interested in the regional distribution oÍ beneÍits Írom the use oÍ publicly provided goods
and services.
These Íiscal incidence studies have the Íollowing drawbacks. First, ditferent ypes
oÍ Íiscal Ílows have a ditferent impact on income or welíare. The eÍÍect oÍ investment
programmes is not comparable to the impact oÍ social security beneÍits. This aspect is
often neglected in net Í iscal f low studies. Second, 'source oÍ income' and 'use of income'
are effects oÍ central government expenditures to be distinguished. ldeally, incidence
studies should incorporate both etÍects simultaneously.
Hence, even when restricted to the Íiscal Ílows oÍ central government, each
expenditure and each revenue programme still has separate types oÍ welÍare etÍects. The
mix of the welÍare eÍfects depends upon the type of Íiscal Ílow at hand and the concept
of welÍare that is used.
In this study it is assumed (chapter 2) that total regional welÍare is a Íunction oÍ all private
and all publicly provided goods and services consumed by the population oÍ the region
concerned. Under a certain number oÍ assumptions, regional welÍare may be measured
by a social welÍare Íunction with two components.
First, the total regional disposable income oÍ households. Disposable income is
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equal to the total oÍ all primary incomes oÍ households plus all secondary income
transÍers received. Such secondary income transfers are not tied to the
consumption oÍ goods or services. They only have an etfect on the level of
disposable income and they do not inÍluence the pattern oÍ consumption.
Examples oÍ secondary transÍers are income laxes, social security contributions
and social security benefits.
Second, total net beneíit of the consumption oí publicly provided goods and
services by regional households. The transÍers received or paid by the central
government are tied to the consumption oÍ goods and services. These transÍers do
afíect total disposable income as well as consumption patterns. Examples oÍ such
transÍers are the value added taxes, renl allowances and the subsidy embodied in
publicly provided goods and services.
From a consumers' point of view, one may not add these two terms, because oÍ the
principal dilÍerence in public beneÍits which are part oÍ disposable income versus imputed
benefits oÍ publicly provided goods and services.
This social welÍare approach has the advantage that one may regionalize Íiscal
Ílows according to three clearly distinguished efÍects oÍ such Ílows on regional welÍare.
ïhe three eÍfects are:
1. Primary income eftects. Central government inÍluences the size and the
composition oÍ total primary income per region through: (1) paying salaries to its
employees, (2) buying inveslments and consumption goods and services from the
private sector, (3) taxing proÍits oÍ enterprises.
2. Secondary income efíects. Central government redistributes primary income
through direct taxes and social contributions on the one hand and untied income
transfers on the other hand. When secondary transfers are added to primary
income, total disposable income oÍ the household sector is obtained.
3. Tertiary income eflects. Central government, finally, influences regional welÍare
through the subsidized part oÍ publicly provided goods and services, indirect axes
and tied income transÍers (= non cash beneÍits).
The method to regionalise Íiscal Ílows can be described by answering the Íive Íollowing
questions (chapter 2)
1. First, which fiscal f lows are to be considered? The method is restricted to actual
fiscal Í lows. This means that the welÍare effects oí tax subsidies and non-Íinancial
regulations uch as environmental policy are excluded.
2. Second, which fiscal Í lows atÍect which kind of income? All actual Í iscal Í lows affect
one or two oÍ the income components: primary income, secondary income or
tertiary income. One category has etÍects on primary income as well as on tertiary
income. These fiscal Í lows consist oÍ inputs Íor publicly provided goods and
services and are called 'transformalion exoenditures'. Salaries and investments are
transÍormed in publicly provided goods and service. Inputs atfect primary income,
output atÍects tertiary income.
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Third, which incidence principle is used? The above mentioned incidence studies
are partial. Only in regional computable general equilibrium models, tax shifting,
beneÍit snatching, and income and substitution efÍects can be adequately
estimated. In partial studies, like lhis one, the essential question is which incidence
principle is to be used. This study employs the 'etfective incidence' principle. This
approach does not consider income- and substitution eÍÍects oÍ Íiscal Ílows, but tax
shifting and benefit snatching are embedded in the allocation rules. Etfects on the
size oí national income are not considered. The total amount oÍ the allocated Íiscal
Ílows is equal to lhe total amount oí the central government budget. To remain
operational, any approach almost necessarily has to restrict itselÍ to the
measurement oÍ Íirst order etÍects on regional welÍare and has to disregard income
and substitution efÍects (tax shitting and beneÍit snatching excluded).
Which types oÍ Íiscal flows are to be allocated to regions? Which region pays the
ditferent types oÍ revenues oÍ the central government and which region beneÍits
Írom the difÍerent types oÍ expenditures? Answering these questions requires much
data, which have to be collected and - partly - adjusted. In all 414 expenditures and
87 revenues programmes have been regionalized. For The Netherlands much
regional data can be derived Írom the national income accounts and statistics on
distribution oÍ personal income (CBS, 52; CBS, 517; CBS, S20).
How are these money Ílows to be translated into income efÍecls?
The impact oÍ primary money Ílows on the primary income oÍ households has to be
estimated. With an interregional input-output model, in principle, the variety in
multiplier etfects oÍ ditÍerent categories oÍ expenditures and revenues can be
captured. Such models have been applied Íor the three Northern provinces oÍ
Groningen, Friesland en Drenthe.
Secondary Ílows oÍ transÍers are subtracted Írom and added to primary income, to
obtain total disposable income oÍ households. The inequality oÍ the interregional
distribution oÍ primary and disposable income can lhen be compared.
Tertiary Ílows: The intention is to translate the flows in lerms oÍ utility. In most
empirical studies it is assumed that the costs oÍ publicly goods are equal to uti l i ty.
This holds true iÍ one assumes that the outcome oÍ the public decision making
process accurately reÍlects all individual preíerences imultaneously (Haselbekke,
1  981  ) .
Table ' l  shows main results oÍ the applied method (chapter 4). The Íirst column shows
average primary income per capita over the period 1979-1986. Provinces (eleven in all)
are ranked on the base oÍ the primary income. Interprovincial primary income difÍerences
in The Netherlands are small, ranging between 24%-points. Inhabitants oÍ the core
provinces (Utrecht, Noord-Holland en Zuid-Holland) have a higher average primary
income per capita than inhabitants oí peripheral provinces l ike Groningen, Friesland,
Drenthe, Overijssel and Limburg.
The net-primary money f/ows per capita are not evenly distributed over provinces
z t ó
Table 1 Primary, secondary and tertairy income per capita, 1979-1986 averages
Primary Net- Primary Net- Disposable Net- Tertiary
income pri- income Secondary income tertiary income
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' Estimated with an bi-regional l-O-model with consumption Íunction;
'? The estimated primary income per capita oÍ the remaining provinces is Gld 6270
(1o2).
Oable'l , column 2). These net-Ílows are equal to the difíerence between primary Ílows
received (salaries, interests) and primary Ílows paid (interests, corporate income tax).
Provinces with high average primary incomes receive relatively more.
These primary money ílows have to be translated lo primary income-efíects. In
small open economies many transÍers wil l spil l-over into other regions. These spil l-over
effects are estimated Íor the three Northern provinces (Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe)
by means oí three bi-regional Input-Output-models. Column 3 oÍ Table ' l  shows the
results oÍ the l-O-calculations. The induced primary income-efÍects are relatively small in
Drenthe en Friesland and somewhat larger in Groningen. Although primary income-
etÍects cannot be estimated Íor all Dutch provinces, the conclusion is that primary
activit ies of central government do increase interprovincial primary income differences
somewhat. The unequal distribution oÍ the primary money Ílows explains most oÍ this
resul t .
Column 4 oÍ Table 1 shows the results oÍ central government secondary activities.
Because secondary transÍers Íinance a large part oÍ central government's primary
z I  q
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activities, the national net-result is negative. Core provinces lose much more secondary
transÍers than peripheral provinces. Column 5 - as compared to column 1 - shows that
secondary transíers reduce the interprovincial primary income diíerences considerably.
In terms oÍ the 'power ratio'the average reduction over the period 1979-1986 is 61%.
Benefits, particularly disablement beneÍits (AAW&WAO) and retirement beneÍits (AOW)
have the stÍongesl equalizing etÍect (57%). The 'secondary' taxes reduce interprovincial
income difierences by 11%, whereas 'secondary' social security contributions increase
interprovincial income differênces by 7%.
Columns 6 and 7 oí Table 1 show the results of the tertiary activities oÍ central
government. The national net-eÍfect equals zero. This net-etfect is the diÍÍerence between
'tertiary' taxes paid (value added taxes, central governments' gas revenues) and beneÍits
received (rent allowances, consumption of publicly provided goods and services, etc.). lt
is assumed that the net-production costs (cost -/- retributions) oÍ the goods and services
concerned are equal to consumers' utility (cost oÍ service method). Costs are attributed
to consumers in proportion to the amount consumed. Between provinces the net-etfect
varies somewhat. The core provinces, Utrecht and Noord-Holland - with high primary
incomes per capita ' contribute. Most peripheral provinces with relatively low primary
incomes are benefited. In terms oí the power ratio teíiary activities oÍ central government
reduce the interprovincial secondary income ditferences by anotheÍ 19%. Tertiary benefits
cause arê the sole cause (31%). 'Tertiary'taxes (VAT, gas revenues paid by households),
however, enlarge the interprovincial income diÍÍerences with 12%.
Although the above conclusions are rather stable over the period oÍ investigation,
there are three exceptions. First, over the period 1979-1985 central governments' gas
revenues did extremely rise because oÍ increased energy prices. The contributions of
provinces with energy-intensive industrial structures (Groningen, Zuid-Holland en
Zeeland) increased accordingly. Second, primary beneÍlts of the province oÍ Zeeland
shrunk over the period, because the 'Deltawerken' (a large project to protect this
province Írom flooding) were completed. Third, the strong secondary equalizing etÍect
increased over the period because oÍ a rise in unemployment beneÍits in provinces with
low primary incomes per capita.
ïhe main conclusions are that central government primary activities increase
interprovincial primary income diÍÍerences. Secondary activities and to a lesser degree
tertiary activities, however, have a strong egualizing efíect. The overall result oÍ Dutch
central government money Ílows is a stÍong reduction oÍ interprovincial income
inequality. When welÍare is measured using tertiary income, the remaining interprovincial
welÍare variation is very small. Some cautionary notes have to be made. First, welÍare is
deíined in terms oÍ income. Other deíinil ions may lead to other conclusions. Second,
provincial incomes ditÍer Írom provincial spending levels because oÍ regional dilÍerences
in savings and costs oÍ l iving. In The Netherlands these ditÍerences are, however, small.
Third, some interregional ditÍerences might be overlooked because oÍ the chosen
regronal classiÍication: by provinces.
The second part oÍ this thesis shows the regional distributive impacts oÍ some major
individual public programs by means oÍ a traditional Íiscal Ílow analysis. In these
analyses all Íiscal flows are added, irrespective oÍ their welÍare efÍects. Although this
assumption is not always realistic, and our method is preÍerable Írom a scientiÍic point oÍ
view, regional policymakers preÍer these partial studies. They are more interested in the
size oÍ the received budgets and are less interested in the economic etfects oÍ financial
f lows. In this study the impacl oÍ the Íollowing public programs on regional income
distribution has been investigated: regional policy, potential regional policy (chapter 5),
passengêÍ tÍansport policy (chapter 6), tax policy (chapter 7) and social security policy
(chapter 8). All Íiscal flows arQ imputed to provinces according to the primary and
secondary income approach. Table 2 shows results oÍ this analysis. The provinces are
ranked on the base oÍ primary income per capita flable 1, column 1).
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' Total national revenues are raised equal to total expenses;
'Averages over the period 1980-1986.
The Íirst column oÍ Table 2 shows the net-redistribution through all public ptograms
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in million guilders (see also paragraph 4.9). The interprovincial redistribution amounts to
Gld 2.6 billion, or equals 1.3% oÍ total otrtlays. The equalizing effect on interprovincial
income difÍerences is not unambiguous. Not all provinces with high respectively low
primary income are net-contributors, or net-receivers respectively. The largest net-
contributor are Íoreign consumers of Dutch natural gas. Their contributions are allocated
to the e)dra territorial sector (ETS, Gld 3.1 billion). Furthermore, the contribution oÍ Noord-
Brabant and to a lesser degree that oÍ Zuid-Holland is relatively large. The largest net-
receivers are Groningen, Gelderland and Umburg. Noord-Holland and Utrecht with high
primary incomes per capita are net-receivers also.
The interprovincial redistribution through regional policy programmes (Gld 0.6
billion) is smaller than the redistributive impact oÍ total policy, but il is Íar more eÍfective
(30% versus 1.3%). Provinces with low primary income per capita are net-receivers.
Provinces with high primary incomes and the ETS are net-contributors. With a least
square analysis the spatial distribution of regional Íunds is evaluated, starting ÍÍom
regional policy principles that regions with high unemployment and low incomes receive
more Íunds. The results oÍ this analysis show thal policymakers also seem to have other
motives to distribute the Íunds and that they react weakly on changes in regional
unemployment or income levels.
The third column oÍ Table 2 shows the geographical distribution oÍ Íiscal Ílows oÍ
the so-called potential regional policy (chapter 5). The characteristics oÍ these
programmes are comparable to the óaracteristics oÍ regional policy instruments, but
they are not limited to speciÍic regions. The spatial distribution oÍ Ílows under both policy
instruments is almost similaÍ, although there are some ditÍerences. The Íirst ditference is
that the total interprovincial redistribution is somewhat smaller (Gld 0.4 billion or 47o oÍ
the outlays). Second, two provinces with high primary incomes per capita @eeland en
Zuid-Holland) are net-receivers.
The Íourth column oÍ Table 2 shows the redistributional etÍects ot passenger
transport policies (chapter 6). Passenger tÍansport policy redistributes Íunds (Gld 0.7
billion) írom peripheral provinces with low primary incomes to core provinces with high
incomes. Through excises on gasoline and road taxes, inhabitants oÍ peripheral
provinces bear a large share oÍ the costs oÍ public transpoÍt and inÍrastructure in the core
provinces, although their car mobility is lower than that oÍ inhabitants oÍ core provinces.
Given this result a road tax system is recommended, which takes into account these
provincial difÍerences.
The Íifth column oÍ ïable 2 covers interprovincial redistribution through soaa/
security policy (chapter 8). From provinces with high income to provinces with low
incomes is shifted Gld 4 bil l ion. The size oÍ this redistribution is the largest oÍ all policy
areas investigated and is six times that oÍ regional policy itselÍ. Benefits, especially
disablement benefits and transÍers to elderly, cause most oÍ this redistribution. Social
security contributions, however, enlarge interprovincial income difÍerences.
Central governments' tax policy is also instrumental in total redistribution (chapter
7). Provinces with high primary incomes contribute relatively more than provinces with
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low primary incomes. By means oí a regression analysis it is shown that variation in tax
liabilities (primary income oÍ households and corporate proÍits) explains ditÍerences in tax
revenues. The example oí a hypothetical provincial tax system illustrates the Íact that
such a syst€m enlarges provincial tax difÍerences. DitÍerences in tax bases and provincial
spending patterns explain this result.
These partial analyses serve to illustrate lhat some public programs enlarge
interprovincial income difÍerences, while other reduce these difÍerences.
Based on the results obtained, the Íollowing policy recommendations can be Íormulated.
First, iÍ policymakers do not accept large spatial difÍerences in welÍare, they have to
pay more attention to the spatial impacts oÍ various programmes that are not primarily or
explicitly intended to chargê the distribution oÍ incpmes (welÍare). For example, a
reduction of the level of disablement benefits will reduce spending capacity oÍ consumers
relatively more in peripheral provinces (Oost-Groningen, Zuidoost-Drenthe n Zuid-
Limburg) than in the core provinces, because the first group oí provinces has relatively
more recipients.
Second, given the small welÍare difÍerences Íound between provinces, continuation
oÍ regional policy is hard to justity. However, one has to realize that the welÍare concepl
used is based on income. lt does not include the aspect of how incomes (wages versus
beneÍits) are obtained. Wages have the same weight as a benefits of equal amount.
Commonly, however, jobs are preÍerred over unemployment. When this fact is accepted,
regional policy within The Netherlands may sti l l  be justiÍ ied, because (hidden)
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